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In their recent article “Bodily synchro-
nization underlying joke telling,” Schmidt
et al. (2014) argue that two-person neu-
roscience is an insufficient approach
to explain interpersonal coordination.
Interpersonal entrainment, they claim,
must be understood bearing in mind
that the whole person is embedded in
an embodied and social situation. To this
effect, they present novel motion-capture
data on bodily coordination during a
knock-knock joke telling task. Schmidt
et al. (2014) make a valid point in calling
attention to the complexity of synchro-
nization activity. Precisely because of its
importance, however, we believe it is nec-
essary to highlight methodological and
substantive caveats that render their work
ultimately unsuccessful in accounting for
human coordination in natural social
interactions.
Schmidt et al. (2014) characterize
their research perspective—behavioral
dynamics—as one that “uses concepts
and tools from nonlinear dynamical sys-
tems to tackle social entrainment as an
instance of self-organization, where indi-
viduals form a social unit, a dynamical
interpersonal synergy, without planning,
to construct meaningful actions together”
(p. 2, emphases added). Yet when their
experimental procedure is examined, lit-
tle of the interaction between the test
subjects can be considered meaningful
or unplanned. Prior to the experiment,
participants were asked to engage in
ice-breaking tasks, so that they “became
accustomed to coordinating their move-
ments” (Schmidt et al., 2014, p. 4). Also,
by the time the experiment began, par-
ticipants were already habituated to the
jokes they would have to tell—and lis-
ten to—having been asked to “familiarize
themselves with the joke’s lines and their
concomitant puns” (Schmidt et al., 2014,
p. 4). Any element of surprise at the
joke’s punch line was therefore lost. We
are informed furthermore that the entire
series—which consisted of ten jokes—
was read aloud six times throughout the
experiment. Such a high degree of rep-
etition could compromise participants’
understanding of the meaning of the jokes,
producing semantic satiation (Falk et al.,
2014). Thus, the procedure that subjects
are told to engage in can hardly be con-
sidered a “joke telling ‘dance”’ (Schmidt
et al., 2014, p. 3), unless: (a) we understand
“dance” as a pre-established, repeatedly
trained sequence of steps; and (b) we think
that repeating a joke script six times has no
impact on the sense of a natural joke telling
interaction, namely being funny. The fact
that no data is reported regarding how
enjoyable participants found the jokes,
even though said reports were collected, is
telling.
A further threat to ecological valid-
ity is the fact that the temporal struc-
ture of the joke telling ritual did not
emerge naturally during the interaction. It
was rather imposed by the experimenters
who “demonstrated the pace of telling so
that each joke takes approximately 5–7 s”
(Schmidt et al., 2014, p. 5) in such a man-
ner that “each of the first four lines is said
isochronously, 1 beat each for each line,
comprising 4 beats for the setup of the
joke; and typically the last (punch) line is
given 4 beats (2 beats to say the line and
2 beats pause before the next joke) for the
conclusion of the joke” (Schmidt et al.,
2014, p. 4). This procrustean timetable
must be understood as in the benefit of the
analyses, but we must not lose sight that
it comes at considerable cost to what lit-
tle naturalness remains of what should be,
supposedly, a natural interaction. Hence,
while Schmidt et al.’s (2014) intent of
studying spontaneous, meaningful human
activity is praiseworthy, the way in which
the experiment was run is eerily remi-
niscent of the studies of artificial bod-
ily movements from which they allegedly
were trying to separate themselves.
Modifying a joke telling situation to the
point of making it a stereotypical ritual
is not irrelevant for behavioral entrain-
ment insofar as human participants are
not telling jokes anymore, but just follow-
ing the experimenters’ instructions ver-
batim (Cutica, 2007). Although physical
in nature, bodily coordination is more
than mere physical movement; rather, it is
tightly related to communicative (Kendon,
1970) and social (Semin and Cacioppo,
2008) dimensions of human experience.
Therefore, behavioral entrainment does
not emerge as a by-product of human
physical co-presence and joint actions,
independently from the meaning of those
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actions. Hence, Schmidt et al. (2014)
would have greatly enriched their outlook
by taking the first-person perspective of
their participants into account, as has been
subtly done in recent studies (Froese et al.,
2014a,b).
In a crucial point, Schmidt et al. (2014)
argue that:
[B]ehavioral entrainment in social inter-
actions can be understood using same
self-organizing processes used to under-
stand the entrainment of mechanical
oscillators (e.g., pendulum clocks). In
this way, social coordination is cast as an
instance of synchronization phenomena
found generically in nature, and thereby,
it can be measured and understood using
mathematical models of synchroniza-
tion (p. 2, emphases added).
As seen, Schmidt et al.’s (2014) hinting
that human interactions behave exactly
like other coupled mechanical oscil-
lators understates the importance of
communicative and social facets of bod-
ily coordination. In order to truly take
these dimensions into account, nonlinear
dynamical systems theory must strive for
designs that capture interaction in a more
ecologically valid way, following their inte-
grative aim (Dale et al., 2013). In this case,
the unnatural way in which participants
were asked to perform had little to do with
those everyday social interactions we call
joke telling. Designing experiments that
more appropriately capture the richness
and complexity of real human interaction
is crucial, but we must also ask ourselves
what we can learn about human coordi-
nation by knowing that the movements
of interacting persons can be modeled
similarly to pendulum clocks, hurricane
displacements or neural activity in the
olfactory bulb. Describing a Van Gogh
self-portrait as an arrangement of oil par-
ticles may be certainly right; but in doing
so we are missing the most important level
of description for such an object. In the
same way, human coordination involves
regular physical movements indeed, but
its interactional meaning is what defines
it as human coordination, and not a mere
physical co-occurrence. It is precisely this
meaning that is missing from Schmidt
et al.’s account.
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